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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2165 
___________ 
 
DANIEL LAUGHLIN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MS. PECK; DAVID SMITH; KIRK HENDERSON; EMEKA IBEMERE;  
SUSAN SENCHAK; SHANNON RANDALL; VALERIE HIEBNER; LT. ARYERS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00213) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2013 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 14, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Laughlin, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing 
his claims against certain defendants, granting summary judgment in favor of the 
remaining defendants, and denying his motions for leave to amend his complaint and to 
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compel discovery.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a 
plenary standard of review over the District Court’s dismissal order and grant of 
summary judgment, see Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 
2013) (motion to dismiss); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 
86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment).  We review for abuse of discretion the 
District Court’s orders denying leave to amend the complaint, see Connelly, 706 F.3d at 
217, and denying Laughlin’s discovery motion, see Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 
46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1995).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Laughlin, a Pennsylvania inmate, was housed at State Correctional Institution at 
Albion (“SCI-Albion”) from November 2006 until March 2009.  During part of this time, 
Laughlin was cellmates with Rodney Comer.  In early 2008, Laughlin wrote a letter to 
the District Attorney of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, stating that Comer had 
admitted to a past incident involving the molestation of a child.  Defendants Christylee 
Peck, an Assistant District Attorney, and Detective Smith were assigned to investigate 
Laughlin’s information.  After being interviewed by Smith and Peck, Laughlin agreed to 
testify against Comer.  According to Laughlin, he was thereafter subjected to physical 
assaults and received “snitch letters” as a result of agreeing to testify against Comer.  He 
also alleged that he was sexually assaulted in his cell on three occasions.  Laughlin 
claimed that he requested protective housing and informed several prison officials of this 
abuse.  He also stated that in March 2008 he sent a letter to Defendants Smith and Peck, 
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detailing the abuse he was suffering, and that on July 14, 2008, he followed-up with 
Peck.  At that point, she told Laughlin that she would call SCI-Albion to talk to prison 
officials.  According to Laughlin, however, the abuse continued and did not end until he 
was transferred to the State Correctional Institute in Mercer, Pennsylvania (“SCI-
Mercer”) in March 2009. 
 On August 30, 2010, Laughlin filed in the District Court a civil rights complaint 
against defendants Peck and Smith, as well as several prison officials (“Corrections 
Defendants”).  Laughlin did not specifically mention the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, in his complaint, but the District Court reasonably read the complaint as bringing 
claims for failure to protect in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, as well as a 
claim for First Amendment retaliation.  Defendants Peck and Smith filed a motion to 
dismiss, which the District Court granted.  Subsequently, the District Court granted the 
Corrections Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Laughlin’s motions to 
amend his complaint and compel discovery.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 We first consider whether Laughlin has waived any potential arguments by failing 
to present them in his opening brief, as the Appellees argue.  In his brief, Laughlin claims 
that he is unable to present any argument in support of his appeal because his legal 
materials are missing.  Notably, Laughlin did not file a motion for extension of time to 
file his brief, nor did he seek a stay of the briefing schedule or any other relief from the 
Court.   
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 Generally, an appellant’s failure to present and argue issues in the opening brief 
would result in waiver of the issues on appeal.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 
(3d Cir. 1993); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a).  However, Laughlin proceeds pro se, and 
accordingly, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520-21 (1972).  We are satisfied that Laughlin’s response to question five in his informal 
brief presents a challenge to both the dismissal of his claims against Peck and Smith and 
the denial of his discovery motion.  Accordingly, we will review the merits of the appeal 
with respect to these two issues.  With respect to all other claims, we agree with the 
Appellees that Laughlin has waived any potential arguments. 
 Turning to Laughlin’s claims against Peck and Smith, Laughlin alleged that these 
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from other 
inmates after he was labeled a snitch for testifying against Comer.  First, regarding 
Laughlin’s claims against Smith, liability under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to plead the 
defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, which “can be 
shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence.”  Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 72 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).  Here, Laughlin’s complaint alleged only 
limited contact with Smith:  (1) In January 2008, Laughlin had a meeting with Smith and 
Peck concerning his information about Comer; (2) in March 2008, Laughlin sent a letter 
to Smith and Peck detailing the abuse he was suffering for agreeing to testify against 
Comer; and (3) in July 2008, after Peck told Laughlin that she had not received his March 
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2008 letter, Peck called Smith and he brought her Laughlin’s letter.  These allegations are 
wholly insufficient to show that Smith was personally involved in any alleged 
wrongdoing, and dismissal of the claims against him was proper. 
 With respect to Laughlin’s claims against Peck, to plead a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, a prisoner must allege that state officials acted with deliberate indifference 
to a “substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
828 (1994).  To be liable, state officials must know of and disregard an excessive risk to 
the inmate’s health or safety.  Id. at 837.  Here, in addition to the allegations against Peck 
outlined above, the complaint contains only one additional allegation against her: in July 
2008, after Peck received Laughlin’s letter, she told him that she would call SCI-Albion 
and talk to the prison officials.  There is no other contact with Peck alleged in the 
complaint and there are no further allegations concerning her assurance that she would 
call the prison officials.  While Laughlin alleged that the abuse continued until he was 
transferred to SCI-Mercer in March 2009, even if the allegations are true, the complaint 
does not allege or allow for the reasonable inference that Peck subjectively knew of any 
abuse Laughlin suffered after her contact with him in July 2008.  This is fatal to his 
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim and, thus, the claims against Peck were 
properly dismissed.
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1
 We agree with the District Court that allowing Laughlin to amend his complaint would 
have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
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Laughlin also appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to compel 
discovery, stating that if it had been granted, he could prove that “they” knew about the 
assaults and snitching letters.  We will not reverse a district court’s discovery rulings 
absent “the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial 
prejudice to the complaining litigant.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 
818 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).  Laughlin sought to compel answers to discovery 
requests that he sent on April 2, 2012, and May 11, 2012.  However, discovery had 
closed on March 15, 2012.  Because the case had been pending for almost two years, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laughlin’s motion to compel 
answers to untimely discovery requests.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.  
 
